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Introduction
During the spring of 2020, the COVID-19 crisis began to unfold in the
U.S. Legal scholars exploring the impact of the pandemic on people with
disabilities focused much of their attention on triage protocols. These
scholars debated the legality and ethics of using patient disability as a
basis for rationing ventilators in the face of then-looming ventilator
shortages at hospitals.2 At least initially, stay-at-home orders across the
1
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Compare, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, May Hospitals Withhold Ventilators from COVID-19
Patients with Pre-Existing Disabilities? Notes on the Law and Ethics of Disability-Based Medical
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country were successful in “flattening the curve” and reducing the
demand for ventilators.3 However, the pandemic’s widespread disruption
of American life caused broader, unexpected consequences for people
with disabilities.4
Jasmine Harris has described disability law’s inability to keep up with
these consequences as the “frailty” of disability rights, noting that the
enforcement of disability laws effectively become “optional and
aspirational” in the face of an emergency.5 These rollbacks of civil rights
form part of a broader, “widespread attack” on disability rights.6
This essay explores one dimension of disability law’s COVID-related
“frailty”: how the pandemic has undermined equal access to employment
and healthcare for Americans who are deaf, hard of hearing or DeafBlind
as healthcare and employment migrate toward telehealth and telework
activities. This essay’s authors—a clinical law professor, a policy attorney
for a national organization representing Americans who are deaf, hard of
hearing or DeafBlind, and a computer scientist—have collaborated over
the past months on detailed advocacy documents that will help deaf
patients and employers navigate the complex new circumstances of
telehealth and telework. This essay presents a brief survey of some of the
Rationing, 130 YALE L.J. FORUM __, at *3 (2020) (arguing that disability-based triage
distinctions violate the Americans with Disabilities Act and other laws),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3559926 with Govind Persad,
Disability Law and the Case for Evidence-Based Triage in a Pandemic, 130 Yale L.J. Forum __,
at *2 (2020) (arguing that disability-based triage is “legally and ethically preferable” to
other methods), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3571139.
See, e.g., N.Y. TIMES, Government Projections Indicate a Summer Spike in US Coronavirus
Infections if Stay-at-Home Orders are Lifted, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 10, 2020, 3:57 PM) (“The models
show a higher demand for ventilators in the short term if states had never issued the
stay-at-home orders.”), https://www.chicagotribune.com/coronavirus/ct-nw-nytcoronavirus-summer-spike-20200410-gcthujs5azg4vjr6bw3uvpgkeq-story.html
[https://perma.cc/GT2P-5H87].
3

See generally Jasmine E. Harris, The Frailty of Disability Rights, 169 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE
29 (2020) (describing rationing problems for people with disabilities in the contexts of
education, housing, and employment), https://www.pennlawreview.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/07/Harris_Final-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/SQ3B-ZEBP].
4

5

Id. at 32–33.

See Danielle Citron and Mary Anne Franks, Cyber Civil Rights in the Time of COVID-19,
HARV. L. REV. BLOG (May 14, 2020), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/cyber-civilrights-in-the-time-of-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/TBH8-TMQN]; Sarah Katz, The
Inaccessible Internet, SLATE FUTURE TENSE (May 22, 2020, 12:14 PM),
https://slate.com/technology/2020/05/disabled-digital-accessibility-pandemic.amp
[https://perma.cc/C6MZ-FJT3].
6
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difficult legal and technical issues we have encountered in healthcare and
workplace accessibility for Americans who are deaf, hard of hearing or
DeafBlind in the pandemic-induced virtual world.
Telehealth and telework activities typically rely on videoconferencing
platforms including Zoom, WebEx, Google Meet, Adobe Connect,
GoToMeeting, Microsoft Teams, and others—including some proprietary
applications used for telehealth—instead of in-person communication. 7
These platforms have accessibility problems because they presume that all
users can see, hear, and speak verbal English.
As a result, many deaf and hard of hearing users require captions,
American Sign Language (ASL) interpretation, and other services to
participate on equal terms in video conferences for telehealth and
telework. But videoconferencing platforms do not provide captioning,
ASL, and similar accessibility services as baseline features. Regardless of
whether a deaf or hard of hearing person is an employer and/or
employee in a telework scenario or is a doctor and/or patient in a
telehealth scenario, someone typically must make separate arrangements
for captioners, ASL interpreters, and other services to make real-time
video meetings accessible.8
Ignorance of the needs of patients and employees,9 coupled with the
perceived logistical and financial costs of procuring accommodations such

The authors collaborated on drafting an accessibility evaluation of several popular
videoconferencing platforms in May 2020. See generally Video Conferencing Platforms
Feature Matrix, DEAF/HARD OF HEARING TECHNOLOGY REHABILITATION ENGINEERING
RESEARCH CENTER (May 29, 2020), https://www.deafhhtech.org/rerc/videoconferencing-platforms-feature-matrix/ [https://perma.cc/JG3N-USML].
7

Some platforms deploy automatic speech recognition (ASR) technologies to provide
automatic captions in limited and experimental circumstances. See Tanya Basu, The
Pandemic Made Life Harder for Deaf People. The Solutions Could Benefit Everyone., MIT
TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (May 28, 2020) (describing impending automatic captioning
functionalities being developed for and added to Zoom and Google Meet),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/05/28/1002314/clear-mask-captioning-livetranscription-deaf-coronavirus-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/435D-MFW2].
8

See Harris, supra note 4, at 30 (“Simply put, society continues to misunderstand
disability—what it means, who the category includes or excludes, its relationship to
impairment, its valence and construction as an identity.”); Michael Ashley Stein, Labor
Markets, Rationality, and Workers with Disabilities, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 314, 333
(2000) (describing “. . . a society-wide absence of accurate information about the
circumstances and capabilities of people with disabilities.”); Michael A. Schwartz, Limits
on Injunctive Relief Under the ADA: Rethinking the Standing Rule for Deaf Patients in the
Medical Setting, 11 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 163, 166 n.13 (2008) (“[B]arriers to heath
9
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as captioning and interpreting services,10 lead many employers and
doctors to disregard accessibility.11 For example, as an anonymous patient
explained to one of the authors:
I had COVID-19 symptoms after arriving back
from a ski trip . . . (that is, I had a consistent
fever, cough, difficulty breathing, etc.) and was
scared witless. One evening, I decided to use my
provider's stand-alone app for after-hours
unscheduled video appointments and to my
surprise the instructions simply said that the
app was accessible to a screenreader [which the
interviewee does not use]. I had no choice but to
try to mime with the telehealth provider and
was given some dubious advice which I think I
misunderstood (6 or 8 Advil every 6 hours, I
think).12
As a result, many deaf and hard-of-hearing employees and patients
are left with no choice but to fend for themselves by pursuing legal actions
under disability law.
Of course, the need for access to captioning and interpreting services
in teleconferencing is not new, and disability law has intervened often in
healthcare and employment to provide that relief. Deaf and hard-ofhearing people have long relied on the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) to guarantee accessibility of in-person healthcare (typically under
Title III of the ADA and associated Department of Justice regulations)13
care for Deaf patients include . . . that doctors may not understand the communication
needs and preferences of Deaf patients.”).
See Stein, supra note 9, at 319 (“existing misconceptions about disabled workers that
substitute for less easily obtainable accurate information tend to sway estimates of
indicators that are meant to signal appraisals of productivity and accommodation cost.”);
Michael A. Schwartz, Deaf Patients, Doctors, and the Law: Compelling A Conversation About
Communication, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 947, 1000 (2008) (“Deaf patients will no longer
accept the argument that their requests are a burden to the medical provider's budget”).
10

See generally Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and
Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413
(1991) (enumerating instances of employment discrimination against people with
disabilities); see also Schwartz, supra note 10.
11

12

Letter from anonymous author to Zainab Alkebsi (on file with author).

See 47 U.S.C. §§ 12182(a) (2020) (barring “a place of public accommodation” from
discriminating against people with disabilities), 12181(7)(F) (defining public
13
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and employment (under Title I of the ADA and associated Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission regulations).14
Healthcare and workplace accessibility typically happens through the
provision of “auxiliary aids and services” that are necessary to ensure
“effective communication” between patients and doctors 15 and
“reasonable accommodations” for employees. 16 Auxiliary aids and
reasonable accommodations for deaf and hard-of-hearing patients and
employees typically include ASL interpreters (either in-person or via
video remote interpreting (VRI) services) and transcription services such
as Communication Access Real-time Translation (CART), as well as
provision of assistive listening devices, video phones, and other associated
equipment. (Title II of the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and
various other state and federal disability laws may also bear on some
types of employment and healthcare scenarios, though a full discussion of
their application is beyond the scope of this Essay.)17
accommodations to include “pharmac[ies]…professional office[s] of a health care
provider, [and] hospital[s].”), 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(iii) (including in the ambit of prohibited
discrimination “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or
procedures” and “a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no
individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated
differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services”).
See generally Schwartz, supra note 10.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a) (barring employers from discriminating against people with
disabilities in a variety of employment contexts), 12112(b)(5)(A) (including within the
ambit of prohibited discrimination a failure to make “reasonable accommodations”
available to an employee with a disability), 12111(9)(B) (defining “reasonable
accommodation” to include the “acquisition or modification of equipment or devices”
and “the provision of qualified . . . interpreters”).
14

See 42 U.S.C. § 12103(1); 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.303(b)(1), (c) (2020) (Department of Justice
regulation defining the scope of “auxiliary aids” and “effective communication” under
Title III).
15

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) (regulations of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) defining the related concept of “reasonable accommodation[s],”
which include “the provision of qualified . . . interpreters; and other similar
accommodations for individuals with disabilities.”).
16

We note briefly that the application of Title II to telehealth offerings administered by
state and local governmental entities—such as many hospitals—does not raise the same
jurisdictional issues that are implicated by the Title III analysis that follows. We also note
that Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act extends the nondiscrimination provisions of Section 504 to some private healthcare entities—namely
those that receive federal funding, including via participation in state healthcare
insurance exchanges—that might otherwise be covered only under Title III. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 18116(a).
17
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Despite these long-standing protections, the applicability of the ADA
to telehealth and telework contexts is open to question. When real-world
activities move to virtual reality, legal actions seeking accessibility in
telehealth and telework will encounter a familiar set of legal issues that
arise in disability law:
1. Jurisdiction and Responsibility. Do the disability laws that
apply to the real-world healthcare and employment activities
apply to the corresponding activity in virtual space? If
disability law applies, does it hold doctors or employers
responsible for ensuring accessibility, or does some
responsibility shift to the new virtual platform—e.g., a
videoconferencing service—for compliance with the disability
law? If disability law does not apply, might
telecommunications law provide a substitute?
2. Remedies. If disability law applies, what are the available
remedies, and are they sufficient to afford functionally
equivalent communication for deaf and hard-of-hearing
patients and employees so that they can receive comparable
healthcare and do their work on equal terms?
I.

Jurisdiction and Responsibility for Telehealth and Telework
Accessibility

Telehealth and telework activities in many respects seem not only
similar to, but substitutive for, real-world healthcare and employment
activities. However, the jurisdictional application of the relevant
provisions of the ADA and its associated regulations becomes murky as
activity shifts from the real world to the virtual and communications
become intermediated through third-party videoconferencing platforms
that are traditionally the domain of telecommunications law. This section
addresses the possibility of imposing accessibility obligations on
healthcare providers, employers, and videoconferencing platforms under
Title III and Title I of the ADA and Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) regulations.
A. Telehealth Accessibility under Title III of the ADA
The dynamic of disability law’s struggle with the physical-to-virtual
shift is most obvious in the application of Title III of the ADA to
telehealth. Title III applies to brick-and-mortar doctors’ offices as “places
6
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of public accommodation.” 18 But does it apply to those same doctors’
telehealth offerings when a patient does not physically go to the office?
That is, can telehealth be conceptualized as a “place of public
accommodation,” thereby requiring an administering doctor to ensure
that it is accessible to patients who are deaf or hard of hearing? Or,
alternatively, can a third-party videoconferencing platform being used for
telehealth be conceptualized as a “place of public accommodation,”
thereby requiring the platform to make its services accessible to people
with disabilities?
While there is not yet any significant Title III case law on telehealth
offerings, the long-running circuit split over the applicability of Title III to
websites is instructive. As one of us previously described it, there are
roughly three interpretations of applicability of Title III to websites:
1. Standalone-Websites-Are-Places Circuits: Courts in the First,
Second, and Seventh Circuits have established that even
standalone websites are sufficiently comparable to brick-andmortar places and can be treated as places of public
accommodation.19
2. Websites-Are-Not-Places Circuit: Courts in the Third Circuit have
established that websites, even those with a nexus to a physical
place of public accommodation, cannot be treated as public
accommodations.20
3. Nexus Circuits: Courts in the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have
established that standalone websites are not places public
accommodations, but can become subject to Title III if they
have a sufficient nexus to a physical place of public
accommodation—such as an online ordering website for a
retail establishment.21

18

See discussion supra, note 13.

Blake E. Reid, Internet Architecture and Disability, 95 IND. L.J. 591, 599 & n.48–49 (2020)
(internal citations omitted) (describing a variety of First, Second, and Seventh Circuit
Title III cases treating standalone websites as places)
19

20

See id. at 599 & n.50

See id. at 598 & n.47 (2020) (internal citations omitted) (describing a variety of Ninth
and Eleventh Circuit Title III cases applying the nexus test).
21
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These interpretations follow courts’ differing conceptions of the
“metaphysical place-ness of websites.”22 That is, they turn on whether a
court—like those in a websites-are-not-places circuit—identifies physicality
as the heart of “places” under Title III, or instead—like those in a
standalone-websites-are-places or nexus circuit— is willing to accept a
conception of “places” that is partially or wholly virtual.23
It seems likely that courts in both standalone-websites-are-places and
nexus circuits will be willing to treat telehealth offerings from healthcare
providers as Title III eligible places of public accommodation as well. This
is likely the case for two reasons:
a. Comparability to In-Person Healthcare. Telehealth offerings
effectively substitute virtual interaction with a doctor, through
the videoconferencing platform, that is functionally equivalent
to the interaction that would have happened between the
doctor and the patient in the doctor’s office. 24 The only
difference is that the doctor may face barriers in using
diagnostic tools or operative measures that require physical
contact with the patient.
b. Nexus to Doctors’ Offices. Likewise, most telehealth services are
provided by doctors with physical offices, and courts willing to
recognize the websites of retail establishments as having an
important connection to the goods and services provided by
the brick-and-mortar store seem likely to recognize that the
provision of telehealth is directly related to the principal
businesses of brick-and-mortar doctors’ offices.25
Conversely, it seems less likely that courts in nexus circuits will be
willing to treat videoconferencing platforms—as opposed to doctors

22

Id. at 604.

23

Id. at 607.

Of course, this analysis may be complicated as exclusively telehealth-offering providers
begin to proliferate in the wake of COVID.
24

But see Abdulmajid Asiri et al., The Use of Telemedicine in Surgical Care: a Systematic
Review, 26(3) ACTA INFORM MED 201 (2018),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6195401/ [https://perma.cc/5CAAN2F4] (describing the use of telemedicine in surgical care). One of the authors recently
experienced the use of videoconferencing platforms during office visits as patient, during
which a doctor initially met face-to-face and then switched over to consulting via Zoom
from different rooms at the doctor’s office to minimize the risk of COVID-19 exposure.
25
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themselves—as Title III eligible places of public accommodations, though
it is possible that courts in standalone-websites-as-places jurisdictions might
take a different approach. This is because videoconferencing platforms are
often offered for general-purpose communication functionality, not
specifically for medical use. This is also because videoconferencing
platforms lack a connection to or even a clear point of comparison to a
specific real-world service. That is, in-person interactions are not typically
intermediated by a third-party service that conveys audio and visuals of
each side of a conversation from one location to another. (The authors do
not necessarily endorse the nexus interpretation of Title III and would
oppose its application to deny deaf and hard-of-hearing patients access to
telehealth.)
It also seems unlikely that courts in a websites-are-not-places circuit will
treat either doctors’ telehealth offerings or videoconferencing platforms as
Title III eligible places of public accommodation. This is because a patient
simply is not physically entering a doctor’s office, but rather sitting at her
home or somewhere else. (We do not endorse the websites-are-not-places
interpretation of Title III and would oppose its application to deny deaf
and hard-of-hearing patients access to telehealth.)
Table 1: Likely Coverage by Circuit of Telehealth Offerings and
Videoconferencing Platforms under Title III of the ADA

Doctor’s
Telehealth
Offerings

Videoconferenc
ing Platforms

StandaloneWebsites-As-Places
Circuits

Likely covered

Unclear

Websites-Are-NotPlaces Circuit

Likely not
covered

Likely not
covered

Likely covered

Likely not
covered

Nexus Circuits

The applicability of Title I of the ADA to telework situations, though
also largely unaddressed by the courts, is more straightforward. This is
because Title I does not regulate “places of employment” or use some
other place-centric definition, but rather focuses on the employer-

9
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employee relationship, imposing obligations on “employers”26 to make
reasonable accommodations for their “employees.”27 While the definitions
of these terms categorically exclude some small employers from Title I’s
ambit, likely in both real-world and virtual contexts alike,28 it is not
obvious that either definition hinges on whether employment happens in
person at a physical location or remotely via videoconference. 29
B. Telework Accessibility under Title I of the ADA
The relatively straightforward application of Title I to employers in
telework situations breaks down when it comes to imposing accessibility
obligations on videoconferencing platforms themselves. This is because it
is highly unlikely that the typical user of a videoconferencing platform
will have any conceivable employment relationship with the platform
provider.
*

*

*

Title III of the ADA is likely amenable (in some circuits, but not all) to
a reading that imposes accessibility obligations on healthcare providers
offering telehealth services. Title I of the ADA is likely amenable to a
reading that imposes accessibility obligations on employers of sufficient
size in all circuits. However, there are significant barriers to applying Title
III or Title I to place direct responsibility on videoconferencing companies
to insure for access to telehealth or telework platforms for deaf and hardof-hearing individuals.

See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (including “employer” in the definition of a “covered entity”
under Title I).
26

See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (requiring covered entities to make reasonable
accommodations for “employees”
27

42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) defines “employee” as “an individual employed by an employer;
Section 12111(5)(A) defines “employer,” in relevant part, as “a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in
each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any
agent of such person;” Section 12111(7) defines “person” as having the same meaning as
the term in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; and Section 2000e(a) broadly defines “person” as including
“one or more individuals, governments, governmental agencies, political subdivisions,
labor unions, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, mutual
companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees
in cases under Title 11, or receivers.”
28

29

See id.
10
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C. Telehealth and Telework Accessibility Under
Telecommunications Law
Notwithstanding the uncertain application of the ADA to
videoconferencing platforms, there is some possibility of imposing
responsibility for accessibility on videoconferencing platforms under
telecommunications law. In particular, FCC regulations under the
advanced communications services (ACS) provisions of the
Communications Act of 1934 (’34 Act), added by the Twenty-First Century
Communications and Video Accessibility Act of 2010 (CVAA),30 might in
principle vest the FCC with the power to tackle the accessibility problems
with videoconferencing platforms.
Unfortunately, the FCC’s implementation of the ACS regulations,
which remains in procedural limbo nearly a decade after the Commission
first implemented the regulations, currently imposes no accessibility
requirements on videoconferencing platforms. However, the possibility
that the FCC could regulate might still give rise to preclusion challenges
against ADA litigation over the accessibility of videoconferencing
platforms.
As a historical matter, Section 255 of the ’34 Act, added by the
Telecommunications Act of 1996,31 requires providers of
“telecommunications services” to make them “accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities,”32 under regulations jointly developed by the
FCC and the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance
Board.33 However, the scope of “telecommunications services,” in relevant

30

47 U.S.C. §§ 617-618.

31

Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat 56.

32

47 U.S.C. § 255(c).

33

See 47 U.S.C. § 255(e).
11
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part, has been limited to basic voice telephone services,34 leaving
videoconferencing as a largely unregulated “information service.” 35
In the CVAA, Congress opened the door to remedying the
shortcomings of Section 255 by creating a new category of “advanced
communications services” (ACS) that includes within its scope
“interoperable video conferencing service.” 36 The CVAA requires
“providers” of ACS to ensure that they are “accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities.”37 In a 2011 Report and Order (the “2011
ACS Order”), the FCC first adopted regulations implementing the ACS
provisions of the CVAA.38
The 2011 Order helpfully concluded that “services and equipment that
provide real-time video communications, including audio, between two or
more users, are ‘video conferencing services’”39 and formally defined the
term “interoperable video conferencing service” to mean “a service that
provides real-time video communications, including audio, to enable
users to share information of the user’s choosing.”40 The definition in the
rules is broad enough to cover videoconferencing services such as Zoom,
which provide video and audio communications between two or more
users.
However, the 2011 ACS Order effectively undercut the applicability of
the ACS rules to modern videoconferencing services because of a debate
47 U.S.C. § 153(53) (defining “telecommunications service” as “the offering of
telecommunications for a fee directly to the public”); (50) (defining “telecommunications
as “the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of
the user’s choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent and
received”); see USTA v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 690–91 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The scope of
“telecommunications services” is presently in flux as litigation over the inclusion of
broadband Internet access services under the term proceeds. See generally Mozilla Corp.
v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Order on Remand, Lifelink and Link Up Reform and
Modernization, No. 11-42 (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-respondsnarrow-remand-restoring-internet-freedom-order-0 [https://perma.cc/5WGC-HN2F].
34

35

See 47 U.S.C. § 153(24) (defining “information service”).

47 U.S.C. § 153(1)(D); 47 C.F.R. § 14.10(c) (the parallel definition of “advanced
communications services” in the FCC’s implementing regulations).
36

37

47 U.S.C. § 617(b).

Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Implementation of
Sections 716 & 717 of the Commc'ns Act of 1934, 26 FCC Rcd. 14,557 (2011) [hereinafter 2011
ACS Order].
38

39

Id. at 14,578.

40

47 C.F.R. § 14.10(m).
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over the inclusion of the unclear modifier “interoperable” in the CVAA’s
accessibility requirements for “interoperable video conferencing
services.”41 The FCC concluded that the word “interoperable” could not
be read out of the statute and had to be given contextual meaning.42 The
FCC also considered and rejected the possibility that the word
“interoperable” was a requirement for videoconferencing services to be
interoperable with each other or that interoperability could be treated as a
subset of the statute’s requirements that ACS be accessible and usable. 43
This meant that the term “interoperable” had to be read as a limitation on
the scope of covered videoconferencing services—i.e., that its rules only
apply to those videoconferencing services that are interoperable, and not
those that are not interoperable.44
While concluding that the term “interoperable” in the statute had to
mean something, the Commission could not resolve and punted to a
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM) what the term actually
meant, teeing up three possible definitions of “interoperable” video
conferencing services:
1. those that are “able to function inter-platform, inter-network,
and inter-provider”;
2. those that “having published or otherwise agreed-upon
standards that allow for manufacturers or service providers to
develop products or services that operate with other equipment
or services operating pursuant to the standards”; and/or
3. those that are “able to connect users among different video
conferencing services, including VRS [video relay service].”45
Nearly a decade later, the Commission has yet to resolve the scope of
“interoperable” or rule on the ACS FNPRM. A Second Report and Order

The CVAA refers to “interoperable videoconferencing services.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(1)(D)
(emphasis added).
41

42

2011 ACS Order, 26 FCC Rcd. at 14,577.

43

Id.

The Commission affirmed this conclusion in a 2012 report to Congress. See
Implementation of Sections 716 & 717 of the Commc'ns Act of 1934, 27 FCC Rcd. 12,204,
12,222 (2012) (“There may, however, still be many accessibility barriers to new
communications technologies that fall outside the scope of the CVAA, including, for
example, video conferencing services that are not interoperable.” (emphasis added)).
44

45

Id. at 14,686.
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on the ACS rules issued in 2013 made no reference to the dispute over the
scope of “interoperable.”46 Another Report and Order in 2016 expounded
at length on the term “interoperability” in the context of accessibility rules
for Real-Time Text (RTT),47 but made no reference to videoconferencing or
the pending “interoperable” dispute from the ACS FNPRM. The FCC’s
2016 biennial report to Congress on the ACS rules acknowledged that the
dispute and the FNPRM remained “pending”;48 the 2018 biennial report
made no mention of the dispute or the FNPRM.49 And in addition to the
uncertain scope of “interoperable” video conferencing services, the FCC
left unresolved in the ACS FNPRM the details of what it even means for
an interoperable videoconferencing service to be “accessible.” 50
As long as the FNPRM on the scope of “interoperable” remains
pending, it is unlikely that the FCC’s rules can be leveraged to impose
Implementation of Sections 716 & 717 of the Commc'ns Act of 1934, 28 FCC Rcd. 5957
(2013).
46

47

Transition from TTY to Real-Time Text Technology, 31 FCC Rcd. 13,568, 13,584–86 (2016).

Biennial Report to Congress, Implementation of Sections 716 & 717 of the Commc'ns Act of
1934, 31 FCC Rcd. 11,065, 11,070 n.34 (2016), https://www.fcc.gov/document/2016cvaa-biennial-report. The Commission similarly alluded to the pendency of the FNPRM
in the 2014 Report to Congress. Implementation of Sections 716 & 717 of the Commc'ns Act of
1934, 29 FCC Rcd. 11,909 n.242 (2014) (acknowledging a commenter’s position that “the
Commission has not resolved the issue of how to define the term ‘interoperable’”).
48

Biennial Report to Congress, Implementation of Sections 716 & 717 of the Commc'ns Act of
1934, 33 FCC Rcd. 9828 (2018), https://www.fcc.gov/document/2018-cvaa-biennialreport [https://perma.cc/ELA5-FZ4G].
49

2011 ACS Order, 26 FCC Rcd. at 14,686–87 (“[W]hat does ‘accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities’ mean in the context of interoperable video conferencing
services and equipment? Are accessibility performance and other objectives different for
‘interoperable’ video conferencing services?”). The Rehabilitation Engineering Research
Centers on Universal Interface & Information Technology Access (RERC-IT) and
Telecommunications Access (RERC-TA) proposed objective testable performance criteria
for ACS accessibility, but the FCC punted them to the FNPRM and has yet to be formally
incorporate them into the rules. Id. at 14,690. The lack of clarity on the meaning of
“accessibility” means that, even if the FCC’s rules were formally applied to
videoconferencing platforms, it would remain uncertain whether the platforms would be
required to support the inclusion of sign language interpreters, captioning, or text
communications. About half of the platforms surveyed in the Video Conferencing Platforms
Feature Matrix, supra note 10, do not even provide for at least some of their plans dial-in
numbers that are necessary to allow deaf and hard-of-hearing users to use third-party
relay services, and some platforms have usability or feature limitations on text
communications. The FCC also raised as-yet unresolved questions in the FNPRM about
the relationship between videoconferencing accessibility and the relay system. See 2011
ACS Order, 26 FCC Rcd. at 14,690 n.781. For further discussion of the relationship
between videoconferencing accessibility and the relay system, see discussion infra Part
III.
50
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accessibility obligations on videoconferencing platforms like Zoom.
Moreover, the FCC’s failure to resolve the “interoperable” issue not only
limits the scope of the FCC’s rules, but raises the prospect of an array of
preclusion issues in any litigation to apply the ADA to videoconferencing
platforms.
The FCC implied in the 2011 ACS Order that the CVAA might
preclude the use of a private right of action, like the ADA, against conduct
that might violate the ACS rules,51 likely alluding to Section 255’s express
disclaimer of a private right of action to enforce Section 255 or the FCC’s
implementing regulations.52 The FCC’s implication is questionable, given
that the ACS provisions of the CVAA do not have an express bar on
private enforcement like Section 255 does.
Nevertheless, the lack of resolution and unclear scope of the
“interoperable video conferencing rules” means that any ADA litigation
over videoconferencing platforms could lead to primary-jurisdiction
challenges. The primary-jurisdiction doctrine, “applies where a claim is
originally cognizable in the courts” but “requires the resolution of issues
which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special
competence of an administrative body,” in which case “the judicial
process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative
body for its views.”53
As a result, a court contemplating the application of the ADA to a
videoconferencing platform might refer the question back to the FCC for
resolution of the presently uncertain scope of the “interoperable video
conferencing rules.” When the FCC ultimately resolves the scope of the
rules, exhaustion challenges to ADA claims might arise if the scope of the
rules is interpreted to cover videoconferencing platforms such as Zoom, 54
2011 ACS Order, 26 FCC Rcd. at 14,676 n.736 (acknowledging a commenters’ assertion
of “the CVAA's preclusion of a private right of action”).
51

See 47 U.S.C. § 255(f). Courts have read the exclusion of a private right of action in
Section 255 and the inclusion of one in other parts of the ‘34 Act to prohibit reading other
sections of the Act as including a private right of action—though none have explicitly
applied this reasoning to the ACS provisions of the CVAA. See, e.g., Sastin 2, LLC v.
Hemingway Ass’n, No. CV-17-1252-D, 2018 WL 6059398, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 19,
2018). But cf. G v. Fay Sch., Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 381, 394–95 (D. Mass. 2017) (rejecting the
assertion of Section 255(f) against the application of the ADA to claims of radiofrequency sensitivity) (subsequent history omitted).
52

53

United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956).

54

See id.
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or field-preemption challenges if not.55 While such challenges might fail
depending on the FCC’s ultimate response, the uncertainty and possibility
of delay is likely to stand as a barrier to ADA litigation against
videoconferencing platforms.
II. Remedies for Telehealth and Telework Accessibility
Articulating the details of how to overcome the accessibility
shortcomings with telehealth and telework is a critical policy priority.
However, the lack of clarity surrounding the disability and
telecommunications law sources of jurisdiction for requiring telehealth
and telework to be accessible—as well as the uncertainty about whether
telehealth and telework accessibility should ultimately be the
responsibility of employers/healthcare providers, videoconference
platform providers, or some combination of both—it is difficult to predict
what specific remedies might ultimately be imposed by courts or
regulators.
This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact videoconferencing platforms
have typically been treated under disability law as auxiliary aids or
accommodations in and of themselves, rather than as offerings that need to
be made accessible. That is, videoconferencing platforms are typically
offered to ensure the accessibility of in-person healthcare and
employment, so guidance under disability law does not tend to
contemplate scenarios where platforms themselves might both be required
by a healthcare provider as a condition of obtaining healthcare or by an
employer as a condition for employment. For example, the Department of
Justice’s regulations for video remote interpreting (VRI) services
contemplate necessary features of videoconferencing services that a place
of public accommodation selects to provide a remote interpreter for an in-

See generally Hillsborough Cty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713
(1985) (“Congress’ intent to pre-empt all state law in a particular area may be inferred
where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable
the inference that Congress ’left no room’ for supplementary state regulation. Preemption of a whole field also will be inferred where the field is one in which ‘the federal
interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement
of state laws on the same subject.’”) (internal citations omitted).
55
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person service, but do not guarantee or require that any particular
videoconferencing platform itself will be accessible.56
In the face of the lack of guidance from judicial sources, the authors of
this essay helped draft a series of practical guides,57 backed by a
consensus of a coalition of deaf, hard-of-hearing, and DeafBlind
consumer-advocacy organizations and subject-matter experts, to facilitate
the accessibility of both telehealth58 and telework.59 These guides illustrate
a range of options for courts and agencies to consider in implementing
accessibility requirements after the jurisdictional questions in the first
section have been resolved.
While this essay does not reiterate all the details of the guides, the
guides tee up three overlapping categories of options for addressing the
28 C.F.R. § 36.303(f); see Burns v. West Virginia Dep’t of Educ. and Arts, 242 W. Va. 392,
399–400 (2019) (discussing when telework may be a reasonable accommodation under
Title I of the ADA).
56

Though this Essay does not necessarily represent the views of these organizations, we
note here that Prof. Reid contributed to the guides on behalf of his client,
Telecommunications for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing, Inc. (TDI), Ms. Alkebsi on behalf
of her employer the National Association of the Deaf (NAD), and Dr. Vogler on behalf of
the Gallaudet University Technology Access Program (TAP).
57

NAT’L ASS’N OF THE DEAF, COVID-19: Guidelines for Healthcare Providers – Video-Based
Telehealth Accessibility for Deaf and Hard of Hearing Patients (Apr. 17, 2020) (“Accessible
Telehealth Guidelines”), https://tdiforaccess.org/covid-19/healthcare/ and
https://www.nad.org/covid19-telehealth-access-for-providers/
[https://perma.cc/KP4X-PCZ3]. The authors also developed a version of the Accessible
Telehealth Guidelines geared toward patients. NAT’L ASS’N OF THE DEAF, COVID-19:
Video-Based Telehealth Accessibility for Deaf and Hard of Hearing Patients (April 17, 2020),
https://tdiforaccess.org/covid-19/telehealth-guide/ [https://perma.cc/82EA-4FX2]
and https://www.nad.org/covid19-telehealth-access-for-deaf-hard-of-hearing/
[https://perma.cc/G63H-WAUD]. However, the remainder of this Essay refers
exclusively to the guide for healthcare providers.
58

NAT’L ASS’N OF THE DEAF, Remote Workplace Communications Access: Recommendations for
Employers During Times of Expanded Telework (May 29, 2020) (“Accessible Telework
Recommendations), https://www.nad.org/remote-workplace-communications-accessfor-employers/ [https://perma.cc/TM5D-V6RD] and
https://www.deafhhtech.org/rerc/remote-workplace-communications-access/
[https://perma.cc/N7SS-CPWT]. As with the Accessible Telehealth Guidelines, the
authors also developed a version of the Accessible Telework Recommendations geared
toward employees. NAT’L ASS’N OF THE DEAF, Accessible Remote Work Meetings for Deaf and
Hard of Hearing Employees (May 29, 2020), https://www.nad.org/accessible-remotework-meetings-for-dhhemployees/ [https://perma.cc/NY7U-RPQZ] and
https://www.deafhhtech.org/rerc/accessible-remote-work-meetings-for-deaf-and-hardof-hearing-employees/ [https://perma.cc/7KLB-FQ53]. However, the remainder of this
Essay likewise refers exclusively to the recommendations for employers.
59
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accessibility of videoconferencing in telehealth and telework contexts that
may be applicable to both telehealth and telework:
●

Healthcare Provider/Employer Responsibility. Disability law
might seek to hold healthcare providers and employers
responsible for arranging for auxiliary aids and reasonable
accommodations, such as ASL interpreters and CART
providers, for deaf and hard-of-hearing patients and
employers. This approach might:
o create a relatively limited role for videoconferencing
platforms, which would need only to ensure that they
both provide text communication options and
functionally accommodate and interoperate interpreters
and CART providers—i.e., that their user interfaces
accommodate having interpreters on the screen—and
potentially a non-existent role where a telehealth
provider uses a proprietary telehealth system;
o ensure that healthcare providers and employers could
engage specialized interpreters and CART providers
with the subject-matter knowledge necessary to convey
complex medical jargon and other technical subjectmatter and terminology that might be necessary for
some jobs;
o raise questions about the choices and autonomy of
patients and employees to select the services that work
best for them;60

DOJ Title III regulations specify that healthcare providers “should” consult patients
with disabilities “whenever possible” to determine the patients’ preferences for auxiliary
aids or services, but leave to healthcare providers “the ultimate decision as to what
measures to take.” See 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(c)(1)(ii). Contra 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(2) (requiring
healthcare entities covered under Title II of the ADA to “give primary consideration to
the requests of individuals with disabilities” when “determining what types of auxiliary
aids and services are necessary”); see also Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and
Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,375-01, 31,421 (May 18, 2016) (Department of Health and
Human Services regulations applying the Title II “primary consideration” standard to all
healthcare entities receiving federal funding under Section 1557 of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act). See generally Schwartz, supra note 10 (describing in detail the
disconnect between Title II and Title III of the ADA on the issue of consultation and
urging reform to DOJ’s Title III regulations).
60
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o allocate the costs of accessibility primarily to healthcare
providers and employers; and
o raise significant challenges for enforcement, which
would have to be done on a healthcare provider-byprovider and employer-by-employer basis and leave
patients and employees little recourse for shortcomings
in the quality of services provided by third-party
interpreters and CART providers.
●

Videoconferencing Platform Responsibility. Disability law
might also or in addition hold video conferencing platforms
themselves responsible for making all videoconferences
accessible. This approach might:
o raise questions about whether and to what extent
healthcare providers, patients, employers, and
employees could personalize or otherwise play a role in
choosing the accessibility features offered by particular
videoconferencing platforms, or whether they would
have to effectuate patient and employee choice solely by
choosing among platforms;
o place significant pressure on automated speech
recognition (ASR), computer vision, and other
algorithmic technologies that would translate verbal
speech, text, and sign language. Videoconferencing
platforms would likely turn to these technologies in any
effort to make videoconferencing accessible at scale. ASR
technologies have progressed significantly over the past
decade but still have significant quality shortcomings
that cause them to make critical mistakes, while
computer vision and related technologies that accurately
translate between ASL and spoken English are still
impractical;61

See Emily Matchar, Sign Language Translating Devices Are Cool. But Are They Useful?,
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Feb. 26, 2019),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/sign-language-translators-are-cool-butare-they-useful-180971535/ [https://perma.cc/6TWN-446L]; Michael Erard, Why SignLanguage Gloves Don't Help Deaf People, ATLANTIC (Nov. 9, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/11/why-sign-language-glovesdont-help-deaf-people/545441/ [https://perma.cc/FH3X-2KNR].
61

19

Telehealth and Telework Accessibility in a Pandemic-Induced Virtual World

o for platforms relying on automated technologies, be less
likely to easily allow for specialized transcription of
medical jargon and other technical subject matter,
thereby undercutting the suitability of the platforms for
telehealth and many telework applications;
o allow for the allocation of some (potentially significant)
portion of the costs of accessibility to videoconferencing
platform providers; and
o simplify enforcement by centralizing at least some
responsibility for accessibility in a small handful of
videoconferencing platforms.
●

Telecommunications Relay Service. A third approach would
facilitate accessibility through the Telecommunications Relay
Service.62 Administered by the FCC63 and funded with
contributions from telecommunications providers,64 the relay
system encompasses a variety of technologies that allow deaf
and hard-of-hearing users to complete phone calls including
Video Relay Service (VRS)—which allows signing users to
communicate through a sign language interpreter using a
camera and screen-equipped videophone or smartphone
applications; Internet Protocol Captioned Telephone Service (IP
CTS)—which allows hard-of-hearing users to supplement call
audio with captions; and various other services.65 Relying on
the relay system would:
o allocate a limited role for either videoconferencing
platforms or healthcare providers and employers;
o place pressure on—but also afford some additional
autonomy to—patients and employees, who would have
to, and could, select and register for a service of their
choosing;

See generally FCC, Telecommunications Relay Service – TRS,
https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/telecommunications-relay-service-trs
[https://perma.cc/68PH-74MZ ] (last visited June 27, 2020).
62

63

47 U.S.C. § 225(b)(1), (d).

64

47 U.S.C. § 225(d)(3).

65

See Telecommunications Relay Service, supra note 62.
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o limit the possibilities for people to seek out specialized
interpreters versed in medical jargon and other technical
subject matter;66
o allocate costs through a broad-based funding
mechanism that is already designed to work at scale, but
in a way that would add significant and unexpected
demand, because the FCC’s rules currently bar the use of
relay services to facilitate interpretation or transcription
for in-person healthcare and employment scenarios;67
o lead to additional complexity and cognitive overload as
some patients and employees join videoconferences both
via relay service and via video, placing pressure on them
to use two separate screens—one for the relay service
and one for the videoconference and multiplying the
number of participants in a videoconference when
multiple conferees join via relay;68 and
o simplify enforcement by leaving oversight of the relay
system in the hands of the FCC, which currently handles
and adjudicates complaints against relay providers.69
These options, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive—display
tradeoffs in:

The FCC’s regulations nominally require relay Communications Assistants (CAs) to be
“qualified interpreters” that can use “any necessary specialized vocabulary.” See 47
C.F.R. § 64.604(a)(1)(iv). In practice, many interpreters do not possess the necessary skills
to interpret complex conversations involving medical, legal, technical, or other
specialized topics.
66

See Reminder that Video Relay Services (VRS) Provides Access to the Telephone System Only
and Cannot be Used as a Substitute for “In-Person” Interpreting Services or Video Remote
Interpreting (VRI), 20 FCC Rcd 14528 (2005).
67

It is possible that the FCC could both reduce this complexity and the attendant costs of
multiple communications assistants (CAs) joining a conference by allowing relay services
to interoperate directly with videoconferencing platforms, allowing one or two CAs to
provide signing or transcription for all users on a conference. However, even if this is
allowed, videoconferencing platforms still may need to implement the “hooks” for
supporting this interoperability, an issue that could be resolved as part of the resolution
of the meaning of the term “accessible” for interoperable videoconferencing services
raised in the 2011 ACS FNPRM. See discussion supra, note 50.
68

69

See 47 C.F.R. § 64.602.
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● who carries the responsibility and costs of insuring
accessibility;
● how much autonomy people with disabilities retain in selecting
accessibility technologies that work for them;
● how easily each approach can be enforced;
● how easily each approach can adapt to specialized situations;
and
● other considerations.
Conclusion
This essay underscores how disability law’s focus on the real-world
leaves disability rights fragile when the law must suddenly apply to the
virtual world. While disability and telecommunications law ultimately
may be leveraged to increase accessibility in telehealth and telework,
jurisdictional uncertainty leaves open questions for how patients and
workers can vindicate their rights to accessible healthcare and
employment during the pandemic. Policymakers should consider these
issues—as well as the diverse array of remedial choices for the
accessibility of telehealth and telework—as they tackle these problems in
consultation with the deaf, hard-of-hearing, and DeafBlind communities.
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